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 Abstract 
The fundamental freedoms, on which the common European market is based, 
have been present in the Community legal order since its very beginning. The 
fundamental rights, on the other hand, entered into this system later through 
general principles of law, mostly due to the judicial activism of the European 
Court of Justice. They have come a long way from not being considered at all 
to their full and explicit recognition in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty. 
This paper aims at exploring the impact of fundamental rights on the 
internal market law. It will be devoted to situations where there are clashes 
between the fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms. The thesis put 
forward is that the process of balancing conflicting interests has to be anchored 
in the concept of allowable restrictions which can be imposed on the funda-
mental right at issue. 
The analysis focuses on the scope of the right to free speech in the Commu-
nity legal order, most notably on the level of protection accorded to commer-
cial speech. 
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1. Introduction 
The fundamental freedoms, on which the common European market is based, 
have been present in the Community legal order since its very beginning. The 
fundamental rights, on the other hand, entered into this system later through the 
general principles of law, mostly due to the judicial activism of the European 
Court of Justice. They have come a long way from not being considered at all to 
their full and explicit recognition in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, incorpo-
rated into the Constitutional Treaty. 
This paper aims at exploring the impact of fundamental rights on the internal 
market; i.e. on fundamental freedoms. It will be devoted to situations where 
there are clashes between the fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms. 
The inquiry as to whether there is any order of rank will be based on the ECJ 
judgments in Commission v France,1 Schmidberger v Austria2 and Omega3. The 
question of the relationship between the fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms has already commanded considerable attention of the European Court 
of Justice.4 As Advocate General Jacobs put it in the Schmidberger case, it is 
conceivable that the cases in which a Member State will invoke the necessity to 
protect fundamental rights to justify a restriction on the fundamental freedom, 
may become more frequent in the future, as many of the grounds of justification 
currently recognised by the Court could also be formulated as being based on 
fundamental rights considerations.5 
The discussion will give due account of the relationship between the Euro-
pean Union and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
                                                 
1  Commission v. France, Case C-265/95, [1997] ECR I-6959. 
2  Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republic of Austria, 
Case C-112/00, [2003] ECR I-5659. 
3  Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellung-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn, ECJ Case C-36/02 [2005] 1 CMLR 5. 
4  Outside the scope of this paper but relevant for the subject of the clash between 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms is the Court’s judgment in Bosman 
(Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association and Others v Bosman and 
Others, Case C-415/93 [1995] ECR I-4921). Some commentators stress the clash 
between the freedom of movement of workers and the freedom of association and 
assembly. The latter was claimed by the sports organisation which laid down rules for 
the exercise of professional football. In this case the precedence was accorded to the 
right to free movement. For comments see: Stieglitz, Allgemeine Lehren im Grund-
rechtsverständnis nach der EMRK und der Rechtsjudikatur des EuGH (2001), p. 205; 
Gramlich, Grundfreiheiten contra Grundrechte im Gemeinschaftsrecht? (1996) Die 
Öffentliche Verwaltung (DÖV), 801. 
5  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Schmidberger (supra note 2), para 89. 
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Freedoms (ECHR). It is particularly important for two main reasons. First of 
all, the Convention served as a source of inspiration in developing the stan-
dards of protection of fundamental rights in the Union’s legal order. Secondly, 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) explicitly recognises 
the role of the Convention in fleshing out the provisions concerning fundamen-
tal rights (Art. II-112 (3) TCE). In the light of the new explicit competence for 
the Union to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (Art. I-9 (2) 
TCE), the question of the future relationship between these two distinct orders 
becomes all the more pressing. 
The proposition of this paper is to examine diverse predictions that were 
made about the role of human rights in the Community legal order in the past, 
to confront these predictions with the current state (most notably the Charter 
and the Union’s accession to the ECHR), and finally to focus on the future de-
velopments, relating to the impact of values embodied in the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights on the internal market law, that is: fundamental freedoms. The 
analysis of the allowable restrictions on rights and freedoms will enable the 
answering of the main question concerning the order of rank. When a funda-
mental right meets a fundamental freedom – which one prevails? How funda-
mental really is ‘fundamental’? 
The above-mentioned cases, concerning the clash between the right to free 
speech and the freedom of movement of goods, raise questions as to the hori-
zontal effect of fundamental rights and freedoms, when restrictions thereupon 
originate in actions of private persons. The principle of direct effect of the 
Treaty provisions is one of the pillars of the Community legal order. The ECJ 
judgments in Angonesse6, Bosman7, Lehtonen8 or Walrave9 resulted in a dis-
cussion on the horizontal effect of fundamental freedoms. Also the direct effect 
of the prohibition of discrimination has been established.10 Despite the lack of 
                                                 
6  Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, Case C-281/98 [2000] ECR I-
4139. 
7  Bosman (supra note 4). 
8  Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry namur-Braine ASBL v Federation Royale Belge 
des Societes de Basketball ASBL (FRBSB), Case C-176/96 [2000] ECR I-02681. 
9  Walrave v Union Cycliste Internationale, Case 36/74 [1974] ECR 1405. 
10  In Defrenne v Sabena the Court held that the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty 
are formally addressed to the Member States does not prevent rights from being 
conferred at the same time on any individual who has an interest in compliance with 
the obligations thus laid down (Case 43/75 [1976] ECR 455, para 31). And accord-
ingly, that in relation to a provision of the Treaty which was mandatory in nature, the 
prohibition of discrimination applied equally to all agreements intended to regulate 
paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals (para 39); see also 
Stieglitz (supra note 4), p. 172. 
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an established line of case law on the subject, the question of the horizontal 
effect of fundamental rights in the Union has already commanded considerable 
attention among legal scholars.11 Some authors alternatively suggest that the 
private violations of fundamental rights should be analysed within the concept 
of the state protective duties.12 In such a case, the judgments of the European 
Court of Justice discussed below would definitely be at the core of the discus-
sion. Due to the limited scope of this paper, however, a closer investigation 
into the problem of horizontal effect of fundamental rights and freedoms will 
not be possible. 
2. Protection of fundamental rights in the EU 
When established in the 1950s, the European Communities were predomi-
nantly concerned with the creation and operation of the common market, based 
on the four fundamental freedoms (free movement of goods, services, capital 
and persons). This dominating emphasis has been gradually balanced by the 
growing concerns about the need to have recourse to the protection of funda-
mental rights, in order to legitimise the regulation of the common market. 
According to the well established case law, fundamental rights form an integral 
part of the general principles of law, the observance of which is ensured by the 
European Court of Justice. This practice has been codified in Art. 6 of the 
Treaty on the European Union, which reads as follows: 
“[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States , as general principles of Community 
law.” 
The Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States and international human rights treaties on which the Member States 
have collaborated or to which they are signatories.13 The ECHR has been 
accorded a special role in this respect. The TCE reinforces such an approach. 
Art. II-112 (4) TCE includes a reference to the constitutional traditions of the 
                                                 
11  See in particular the Research Training Network “Fundamental Rights and Private Law 
in the European Union”, materials available at <http://www.fundamentalrights.uni-
bremen.de>; see also: Borchardt, in: Lenz, EG-Vertrag Kommentar (2. Aufl. 1999), Art. 
220 EGV, Rn. 35; Stieglitz (supra note 4), p. 172 et seq. 
12  Stieglitz (supra note 4), p. 172 et seq.; Kingreen, in: Calliess/Ruffert, Kommentar zum 
EU-/EG-Vertrag (2. Aufl. 2002), Art. 6 EUV, Rn. 63. 
13  See: Nold KG v. Commission, Case 4/73 [1974] ECR 491. 
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Member States. An explicit competence for the Union to accede to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights has been incorporated in Art. II-9 (2) 
TCE.14 According to Art. II-112 (3) TCE  
“[i]nsofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaran-
teed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those 
laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection.” 
The relationship between the Charter and the ECHR has already been much 
discussed in the literature.15 The Convention is also mentioned in Art. II-113 
TCE, which deals with standards of protection existing under various interna-
tional instruments and aims at safeguarding them (it resembles Art. 53 
ECHR)16. Finally, the explanations emphasise the importance of the ECHR: 
                                                 
14  For analysis of the problem of accession, in particular Opinion 2/94 (Opinion 2/94 on 
Accession of the Community to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759), see: Toth, The 
European Union and Human Rights: the Way Forward, 34 (1997) CML Rev. 491-529; 
De Burca, Human Rights: The Charter and Beyond, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
No.10/01, p. 8; Craig/de Burca, EU Law, Texts, Cases, Materials (3rd ed. 2003), 
chapter 8; Krueger, Reflections Concerning Accession of the European Communities 
to the European Convention on Human Rights, 21 (2002) Penn State International 
Law Review, 89-99; Imbert, Speech at the Judges’ Symposium: The Council of 
Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union’s Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, Luxembourg (16.09.2002), available at <http://www.coe.int>; 
Lemmens, The Relationship between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
and the ECHR: Substantive Aspects, 8 (2001) MJ, 49; Krzeminska, Przystąpienie Unii 
Europejskiej do Europejskiej Konwencji o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych 
Wolności, (2005) Radca Prawny, pp. 5-11; Wetzel, Improving Fundamental Rights 
Protection in the European Union: Resolving the Conflict and Confusion between the 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts, 71 (2003) Fordham Law Review, 2823; Andrej 
Victor Mykola Wasyl Busch, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechts-
konvention für den Grundrechtsschutz in der Europäischen Union (2003). 
15  Lemmens, The Relationship between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
and the ECHR: Substantive Aspects, 8 (2001) MJ, 49; Lenaerts/de Smijter, The Char-
ter and the Role of the European Courts, 8 (2001) MJ, 90; Lenaerts/de Smijter, A “Bill 
of Rights” for the European Union, 38 (2001) CML Rev., 290 et seq.; Tulkens, To-
wards a Greater Normative Coherence in Europe: The Implications of the Draft Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 21 (2000) HRLJ, 329; Parmar, 
International Human Rights Law and the EU Charter, 8 (2001) MJ, 351; McCrudden, 
The Future of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
No.10/01, p. 17 et seq.; Andrej Victor Mykola Wasyl Busch, Die Bedeutung der 
Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention für den Grundrechtsschutz in der Euro-
päischen Union (2003). 
16  Art. II-113 TCE: “Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or 
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“[t]he level of protection afforded by the Charter may not, in any instance, be 
lower than that guaranteed by the ECHR, with the result that the arrangements 
for limitations may not fall below the level provided for in the ECHR.”17  
2.1. When is a fundamental freedom also a fundamental right? 
The fundamental freedoms have to be clearly distinguished from fundamental 
rights. In the Community law context the term ‘fundamental freedoms’ refers 
to the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labour, on which 
the common market is based. Also the commentators point out the difference: 
“There is a crucial difference between the basic freedoms case law and the hu-
man rights case law. The basic freedoms do not provide – with the exception 
of free movement of workers and their access to employment – fundamental 
rights and the jurisprudence of the ECJ on these issues is not one of human 
rights. In this context, the most important difference between the human rights 
case law and the basic freedoms case law is an often overlooked reservation 
the ECJ makes: the Court applies the basic freedoms only if there is no secon-
dary instrument.”18 
The European Court of Justice has repeatedly recognised fundamental free-
doms as subjective rights (according to the German legal terminology), which 
means that they are enforceable before the national courts.19 Despite the 
                                                                                                                                                      
adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their 
specific fields of application, by Union law and international law and by international 
agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.” 
 Art. 53 ECHR: “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogat-
ing from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured 
under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which 
it is a Party.” 
17  Text of the explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter as set out in 
CHARTE 4487/00 CONVENT 50, Brussels, 11 October 2000, CHARTE 4473/00 
CONVENT 49, p. 50. 
18  Von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organization?, 37 (2000) 
CML Rev., 1326 and the referral to the ECJ’s case law: Bosman, (supra note 4), para 
129; Nour Eddline El-Yassini, Case C-416/96 [1999] ECR I-1209, para 45: “… as 
regards the application of the fundamental right of persons to move freely within the 
Community …”. 
19  Ehlers (ed.), Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten (2003), p. 150; Kadel-
bach/Petersen, Europäische Grundrechte als Schranken der Grundfreiheiten, (2003) 
EuGRZ, 693; see also: Salgoil SpA v. Ministero peril Commercio con l’Estero, Case-
13/68 [1968] ECR 453, Reyners v. Belgium, Case-2/74 [1974] ECR 631, Van Dyun v. 
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primary function of accelerating the process of the European integration and 
laying foundations for the formation of the internal market, the fundamental 
freedoms were never reduced to a mere market-related instrumental character. 
This was due to the fact that the formation of the internal market had never 
been considered as an end in itself, independent from the rights of the 
European citizens.20 In the landmark van Gend & Loos decision the ECJ ruled 
that the provisions of the EC Treaty are directly applicable.21 The stipulations 
concerning the free movement of goods, persons, capital and labour aim 
therefore at offering individuals an effective and immediate protection in their 
cross-border commercial activities. 
With reference to the Charter, it has been pointed out that from among the 
four freedoms only the freedom of movement and residence is mentioned in 
Art. II-105 TCE.22 The ECJ has repeatedly referred to the freedom of move-
ment of workers as their fundamental right.23 Indeed some authors point out 
the existence of a fundamental right to freedom of trade.24 In claiming the 
existence of this right a reference to the ADBHU judgment is made, where the 
ECJ ruled that:  
“the principle of free movement of goods and freedom of competition, to-
gether with freedom of trade as a fundamental right, are general principles of 
law of which the Court ensures observance”.25 
Indeed the distinguishing line between the fundamental freedom of movement 
of workers and the fundamental right to free movement is somewhat blurred. 
In the Bosman case the Court kept referring to the right to free movement on 
the part of Bosman. In the context of the freedom of movement of persons the 
ECJ stated that nationals of Member States have in particular the right, which 
they derive directly from the Treaty, to leave their country of origin, enter the 
territory of another Member State and reside there in order to pursue an eco-
nomic activity.26 The distinction becomes all the more blurred in the light of 
                                                                                                                                                      
Home Office Case-11/74 [1974] ECR 1337. 
20  Kadelbach/Petersen (supra note 19), p. 693. 
21  NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1. 
22  Von Bogdandy (supra note 18), p. 1327, footnote 98. 
23  Bosman (supra note 4); see also: Oliver/Jarvis, Free Movement of Goods in the Euro-
pean Community (2003), p. 11. 
24  Petersman, Constitutional Principles Governing the EEC's Commercial Policy, in: 
Maresceau (ed.), The European Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The 
Legal Dimension (1993), p. 40-41. 
25  Procureur de la République v. ADBHU, Case 240/83 [1985] ECR 531, 548. 
26  Bosman (supra note 4), para 95; Roux v Belgium Case C-363/89 [1991] ECR I-273, 
para 9; The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh Case C-370/90 
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Art. II-105 TCE, which embodies the freedom of movement and residence, in 
that it grants every citizen of the Union the right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States. Some commentators point out that 
the freedom of movement of workers encompasses broad areas of activities of 
an individual – not only the ability to work without being discriminated on 
grounds of nationality, but also their personal and family life.27 
2.2. Impact of fundamental rights on the internal market law 
The internal market law has been influenced by fundamental rights as en-
shrined in the ECHR and resulting from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States. It remains to be seen if the instinctive assumption that 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will mark a watershed in the develop-
ment of the internal market law, will prove to be true.28 Some authors point out 
that despite the possible adoption of the Constitutional Treaty the debate on the 
position of human rights in the Union’s legal order has not come to an end yet, 
that in fact – quite the opposite – “the best is yet to come” and that  
“the adoption of the EU Constitution will only be the stepping stone to a truly 
fascinating new phase in the on-going development of European human rights 
law”.29 
The impact of fundamental rights on the internal market law can be dual, in 
that it concerns either the process of approximation of laws or the limitations 
imposed on fundamental freedoms. The fundamental rights serve as signposts 
for the manner in which the process of approximation of law is being carried 
out, in that the new harmonising rules have to be scrutinised for their confor-
mity with fundamental rights, underpinning the internal market. They serve as 
a yardstick by which to judge the legality of Community law. The impact of 
fundamental rights on a fundamental freedom may be dual, in that they may 
serve either as a limitation to a limitation of a fundamental freedom or a limita-
tion to a fundamental freedom. The first aspect embraces situations in which a 
                                                                                                                                                      
[1992] ECR I-4265, para 17. 
27  Avbelj, European Court of Justice and the Question of Value Choices. Fundamental 
Human Rights and an Exception to the Freedom of Movement of Goods, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 06/04, p. 55. 
28  For a discussion on the impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on the internal 
market law see: Weatherill, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Internal 
Market, Francisco Lucas Pires Working Papers Series on European Constitutionalism, 
Working Paper 2003/03, Lisboa. 
29  Lawson, Human Rights: the Best is Yet to Come, 1 (2005) European Constitutional 
Law Review, 27-28. 
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Member State is imposing a restriction on the freedom of movement and this 
restriction is claimed to run counter to the requirements of the protection of 
fundamental rights. The second aspect covers cases in which the Member 
States rely on the fundamental rights when they justify the exceptions to the 
fundamental freedoms. The fundamental rights must serve as signposts for the 
Member States when they rely on exceptions to fundamental freedoms.30 
According to the ERT judgment,  
“when a Member State relies on an overriding requirement relating to the pub-
lic interest or on ground for justification stipulated in the Treaty in order to 
justify a national rule which is likely to obstruct the exercise of a fundamental 
freedom arising from the Treaty, such justification must be interpreted in the 
light of the general principles of law and in particular of fundamental rights.”31  
In this particular case the freedom to provide services had to be interpreted “in 
the light of the general principle of freedom of expression embodied in Art. 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights”.32 Greece granted a television 
monopoly to a single company, which held exclusive rights for broadcasting of 
foreign programs. In the implementation of their Treaty obligations Member 
States are bound by freedom of expression as general principle of law.33 Thus, 
the restriction on broadcasting activities imposed by the Greek law had to pass 
the test of conformity with the right to free speech as incorporated in Art. 10 
ECHR. The fundamental right works here as a limitation to a Member State’s 
limitation to the fundamental freedom. 
3. Free speech meets free movement 
“Art. 10 ECHR is no stranger to the European Court’s case law on free move-
ment.”34 Although not explicitly codified, the right to free speech as provided 
for in Art. II-71 TCE, is not a novelty and has long been present in the Com-
munity legal order. Just as any other fundamental right recognised by the 
                                                 
30  Craig/de Burca (supra note 14), pp. 210 et seq.; de Burca, Human Rights: The Charter 
and Beyond, Jean Monnet Working Paper No.10/01, p. 10 et seq.; Clapham, A Human 
Rights Policy for the European Community 10 (1990) YBEL, 309. 
31  ERT v. Dimotiki Case C-260/89 [1991] ECR I-2925; [1994] 4 CMLR 546, para 42 et 
seq.; see also: Familiapress Case C-368/95 [1997] ECR I-3689, [1997] 3 CMLR 
1329,  para 24. 
32  ERT (supra note 31), para 45. 
33  Wyatt, Freedom of Expression in the EU Legal Order and in EU Relations with Third 
Countries, in: Beatson/Cripps (eds.), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Infor-
mation: Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams (2000), p. 209. 
34  Weatherill, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (supra note 28), p. 32. 
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Union, the freedom of expression has been guaranteed as a general principle of 
law and binding upon the Community institutions and the Member States when 
implementing Community law.35 Art. II-71 TCE reads as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall in-
clude freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers. 
2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected. 
Determination of the exact scope of the exceptions to the provisions of the 
Treaty on free movements in the light of the freedom of expression as a gen-
eral principle of law may raise complex questions, as the case Familiapress v. 
Heinrich Bauer Verlag36 indicates.37 A German magazine granted its readers a 
prize for solving a crossword puzzle. Such practice was not permitted in Aus-
tria where the publisher intended to sell the magazine. The relevant Austrian 
unfair competition law provision was said to protect smaller publishers. The 
Austrian government submitted that through offering free gifts large publishers 
were in a better position to attract consumers and eliminate smaller publishers 
unable to finance this expensive promotion method. The restriction on cross-
border trade was therefore justified as serving the objective of maintaining 
press diversity, which in turn was considered as a means to safeguard freedom 
of expression. Clearly, the protection of fundamental rights adversely affected 
intra-Community trade. The ECJ held that Member States could uphold restric-
tions on cross-border trade, by appealing to the requirements of safeguarding 
the protection of fundamental rights. Interestingly, although the ECJ was rather 
sceptical of the positive effects of upholding the Austrian rule, nevertheless it 
left it for the national court to balance the competing interests.38 
The Schmidberger case raised the question of the need to reconcile the re-
quirements for the protection of fundamental rights in the Community with 
fundamental freedoms enshrined in the EC Treaty. It regarded the question of 
the scope of freedom of expression and assembly, as guaranteed by Art. 10 and 
11 ECHR, and the free movement of goods, in circumstances when the former 
are relied upon as a justification for the restriction of the latter.39 Schmidberger 
was a German transport undertaking, essentially involved in transporting steel 
                                                 
35  Wyatt, Freedom of Expression … (supra note 33), p. 209. 
36  Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungs- und Vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, 
Case C-368/95 [1997] ECR I-3689. 
37  Wyatt, Freedom of Expression … (supra note 33), p. 210. 
38  Weatherill, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Internal Market, Francisco 
Lucas Pires Working Papers Series on European Constitutionalism 2003, p. 35. 
39  Schmidberger (supra note 2), para 77. 
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and timber between southern Germany and northern Italy, using the Brenner 
motorway in Austria. The Transitforum Austria Tirol, an environmental pro-
tection association, gave notice to the Austrian authorities of an intention to 
hold a demonstration, principally against the pollution caused by the heavy 
transport in the Tirol region. It would involve a blockade on this route. The 
competent authorities granted permission. The demonstration had been widely 
publicised and alternative routes were suggested. Schmidberger brought pro-
ceedings against Austria claiming that the authorities failed to guarantee the 
freedom of movement of goods in accordance with the EC Treaty, and claimed 
damages in respect of standstill periods, loss of earnings and additional related 
expenses.40 
The comparison between the following case – Commission v. France41 – 
and Schmidberger is symptomatic of the need to weigh up the competing 
interests in the context of the actual circumstances of the case. The Court em-
phasised that the circumstances characterising the Schmidberger case were 
clearly distinguishable from the situation Commission v. France. In the latter 
the Commission brought an action against France for failing to guarantee the 
freedom of movement of goods on the grounds that the government had not 
taken appropriate measures to protect importers of agricultural products from 
Spain against the demonstrations of French farmers. The demonstration in 
Schmidberger took place after permission was granted by the competent au-
thorities. It blocked the traffic on a single route and on a single occasion. The 
demonstrators were undoubtedly exercising their fundamental right by mani-
festing in public an opinion on a subject of public concern. They did not intend 
to restrict trade in goods of a particular type or origin. By contrast, the French 
demonstrators in Commission v. France were preventing the free trade of a 
particular type of goods originating from Member States other than France, not 
only by obstructing the transport thereof, but also by destroying the products in 
transit and those put on display in shops.42 Consequently, in Schmidberger the 
Court held that the Austrian authorities were entitled to consider that the 
outright ban on the demonstration would have constituted unacceptable inter-
ference with the fundamental right to freedom of expression and assembly. 
Another case in which the Court was required to reconcile the conflict 
between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms was Omega Spiel-
hallen- und Automatenaufstellung-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundes-
                                                 
40  Ibid., para 6 et seq. 
41  Commission v. France (supra note 1). 
42  Schmidberger (supra note 2), para 82-90. 
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stadt Bonn43. In this case, Advocate General Stix-Hackl was dealing with the 
question concerning the order of precedence that is to be afforded to funda-
mental rights as general principles of Community law and pointed out that it is 
particularly questionable whether there is in fact an order of rank between the 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the EC Treaty.44 
She concluded by stating: 
“It appears to me to be significant that in cases such as this the necessary 
weighing-up of the interests involved ultimately takes place in the context of 
the actual circumstances in which in particular fundamental rights are re-
stricted. The need ‘to reconcile’ the requirements of the protection of funda-
mental rights cannot therefore mean weighing up fundamental freedoms 
against fundamental rights per se, which would imply that the protection of 
fundamental rights is negotiable.”45 
Omega was a German company operating a laser installation known as a 
“laserdrome”, inspired by the movie Star Wars. Some protests were directed 
against the operation of the facility. The mayor of the city of Bonn asked 
Omega for a detailed description of the game, warning that a prohibition order 
would be issued if the game involved ‘playing at killing people’. Omega re-
plied that the game involved only hitting fixed sensory tags installed in the 
firing corridors. Having established that the game involved also hitting sensory 
tags placed on the jackets of players in the chest area and at the back, the 
police authority issued an order prohibiting the operation of games involving 
firing at human targets. On appeal, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal 
Administrative Court) held that the lower courts were right to hold that the 
commercial exploitation of a game involving ‘playing at killing people’ consti-
tuted an affront to human dignity as guaranteed in Article 1 (1) of the German 
Constitution. Therefore, under national law, the appeal had to be dismissed. 
The Bundesverwaltungsgericht was, however, uncertain whether the prohibi-
tion was compatible with the freedom to provide services and the freedom of 
movement of goods as guaranteed in the EC Treaty. The question referred to 
the European Court of Justice was as follows: 
“Is it compatible with the provisions on freedom to provide services and the free 
movement of goods contained in the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity for a particular commercial activity – in this case the operation of a so-
called “laserdrome” involving simulated killing action – to be prohibited under 
national law because it offends the values enshrined in the constitution?”46 
                                                 
43  Omega (supra note 3). 
44  Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, Omega (supra note 3), para 48. 
45  Ibid., para 53. 
46  Omega (supra note 3), para 17. 
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Art. 46 TEC, applying by virtue of Art. 55 TEC, allows for restrictions upon 
the freedom to provide services on grounds of public policy, public security 
and public health. The Court referred to its judgment in Schmidberger and con-
firmed that the protection of fundamental rights justifies, in principle, a re-
striction upon fundamental freedoms. The Court shared the opinion of the 
Advocate General, that “the Community legal order undeniably strives to 
ensure respect for human dignity as a general principle of law”.47 Therefore, 
by prohibiting only one variant of the game, namely the one including ‘playing 
at killing people’, the national authorities did not go beyond what was neces-
sary to attain the objective pursued.48 Consequently, the ECJ held that the 
Community law did not preclude a prohibition of an economic activity exploit-
ing games simulating acts of homicide on the grounds of protecting public 
policy by reason of the fact that the activity in question constituted an affront 
to human dignity.49 
4. Degrees of fundamentality. Is there an order of rank  
between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms? 
Despite their importance for the achievement of the internal market, funda-
mental freedoms are not absolute. The free movement of goods can, in certain 
circumstances, be subject to restrictions in accordance with Art. 30 TEC or for 
overriding requirements relating to the public interest, in accordance with the 
ECJ’s consistent case law since the judgment in Cassis de Dijon.50 In the 
Schmidberger case the ECJ held that: 
“since the Community and its Member States are required to respect funda-
mental rights, the protection of those rights is a legitimate interest which, in 
principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, 
even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty”.51 
There exists a disparity in opinions with regard to the interpretation of the 
Court’s statement. Some commentators present the view that the Court ac-
knowledged in explicit terms the equality of fundamental freedoms and fun-
damental rights, thereby opposing at the same time that fundamental rights pre-
                                                 
47  Ibid., para 34; Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, Omega (supra note 3), 74 et 
seq. 
48  Omega (supra note 3), para 36-39. 
49  Ibid., para 41. 
50  Rewe-Zentral Case 120/78 (1979) ECR 649. 
51  Schmidberger (supra note 2), para 74 (in relation to the free movement of goods); also 
Omega (supra note 3), para 35 (in relation to freedom to provide services). 
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vail over fundamental freedoms in abstract terms and as a matter of rule.52 
According to some commentators, by this statement the Court established a 
general principle that in a great majority of cases (i.e. in principle) the funda-
mental rights prevail over fundamental freedoms.53 Such a definite thesis 
seems to be unfounded. The Court merely stated that the need to protect funda-
mental rights can in principle be invoked as a justification for restriction upon 
one of the fundamental freedoms. The conflicting values and interests have to 
be reconciled, however. As the ECJ puts it: 
“The case thus raises the question of the need to reconcile the requirements of 
the protection of fundamental rights in the Community with those arising from 
a fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty, more particularly, the ques-
tion of the respective scope of freedom of expression and freedom of assem-
bly, guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, and the free movement of 
goods, where the former are relied upon as justification for a restriction of the 
latter.”54 
And further that: 
“the interests involved must be weighted having regard to all the circum-
stances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance was struck 
between those interests”.55 
By any means, does the ‘need to reconcile’ implicate that fundamental rights, 
as a matter of rule, prevail over fundamental freedoms. The ‘need to reconcile’ 
means that the conflicting interests have to be balanced so as to make it possi-
ble for them to exist together without being opposed to each other. The 
statement of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in the Omega case has been so far 
the most direct statement questioning the existence of an order of rank between 
fundamental rights applicable as general principles of law and fundamental 
freedoms enshrined in the Treaty.56 The Advocate General referred to the 
phrase ‘need to reconcile’ and concluded that if there exxisted any order of 
rank between the fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms, there would 
have been no need to ‘reconcile’ between them.57 Indeed, such a conclusion 
                                                 
52  Kadelbach/Petersen, Europäische Grundrechte … (supra note 19), p. 696. 
53  Avbelj, European Court of Justice and the Question of Value Choices (supra note 27), 
p. 49-50; in Avbelj’s view the Court did not want to state that explicitly, probably 
because of the prudent reliance on the principle of judicial economy, and did not want 
to engage in a discussion about the potential existence of some fundamental human 
rights in the national legal orders the pursuance of which could be contrary to the 
objectives that the Community recognizes as legitimate. 
54  Schmidberger (supra note 2), para 77. 
55  Ibid., para 81. 
56  Omega (supra note 3), para 48. 
57  Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, Omega (supra note 3), para 49 and footnote 19. 
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seems to stem from the following remarks in the Schmidberger case, in which 
the Court emphasised that the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly 
are subject to certain limitations justified by objectives of public interest. In 
accordance with Art. 10 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
freedom of expression is subject to limitations, which are prescribed by law 
and necessary in a democratic society to achieve one of the objectives speci-
fied in this provision (i.e. public security, morals, health etc.). The last pre-
requisite means that the existence of a pressing social need has to be proved 
and that the restriction has to be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 
The Court referred to a problem of hierarchy of Convention rights by stating 
that unlike other Convention rights, like the right to life, prohibition of torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment which allow no restrictions, freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly may be subject to some limitations.58 The 
debate about whether there is a hierarchy of Convention rights has already 
commanded considerable attention in legal scholarship.59 Anchored within the 
concept of a margin of appreciation that is left to states signatories to the Con-
vention, which – narrower or wider – justifies a stricter or a less strict scrutiny 
standard, the debate at issue raises questions as to whether this concept legiti-
mises a theory of a hierarchy between the Convention rights.60 
Advocate General Jacobs suggested in the Schmidberger case that, in scru-
tinising the justification invoked by the Member States in restricting one of the 
fundamental freedoms, the Court should follow the same two-step approach as 
applied with regard to traditional grounds for justification. That is: (1) whether in 
relying on the particular fundamental right, the Member State is, as a matter of 
Community law, pursuing a legitimate objective in the public interest capable of 
justifying a restriction on a fundamental Treaty freedom, and (2) whether the 
restriction is proportionate to the objective pursued.61 The Court stressed first that 
the competent authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion, but that it is never-
theless necessary to establish whether a restriction placed upon intra-Community 
trade is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued – which in this case is the 
protection of fundamental rights.62 Having taken into account all the relevant 
circumstances of the case at hand (most notably that the motorway was to be 
closed for a relatively short period of time), the national authorities came to the 
conclusion that the prohibition of the demonstration would have constituted too 
                                                 
58  Schmidberger (supra note 2), para 80. 
59  Stieglitz (supra note 4), p. 27. 
60  Ibid., p. 127. 
61  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Schmidberger (supra note 2), para 95. 
62  Schmidberger (supra note 2), para 82. 
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much of a restriction of the demonstrators’ right to free speech and assembly.63 
5. Restrictions on the free movement of goods 
Art. 28 and 29 TEC prohibit, as between Member States, the quantitative re-
strictions on imports and measures having equivalent effect. The ECJ has 
granted a broad interpretation to the term ‘measures having equivalent effect’. 
In its most seminal decision on the subject – Dassonville – it held that  
“all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be 
considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restric-
tions.”64  
Yet, the freedom of movement of goods and the prohibition of restrictions on 
imports and exports are not absolute and might be subject to exceptions, set out 
primarily in Art. 30 TEC, which reads as follows: 
“The provisions of Art. 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or restric-
tions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing 
artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and 
commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade between Member States.” 
In the landmark decision of Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ has developed a list of 
so-called mandatory requirements with regard to the indistinctly applicable 
rules (non-discriminatory rules).65 The list includes such considerations as the 
protection of consumers or fairness of commercial transactions and is not 
exhaustive.66 
The Member States are not, however, granted an absolute autonomy in 
deciding what considerations might constitute a justification for imposing a 
restriction upon the free movement. In departing from the rules established in 
the Treaty, the actions of Member States are subject to scrutiny by the Euro-
                                                 
63  For comments see: Krist, Rechtliche Aspekte der Brenner-Blockade – Versammlungs-
freiheit contra Freiheit des Warenverkehrs, (1999) Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung, 
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pean Court of Justice. The Court applies the test of proportionality and bal-
ances the competing values: the freedom of movement on the one hand and the 
values invoked by the Member States, which, in their opinion, should take pri-
ority over the free movement, on the other. 
6. Human rights considerations in applying Community law 
With regard to the human rights considerations in applying Community law, 
three seminal principles established by the European Court of Justice have to 
be mentioned. 
First of all, Member States are precluded from striking down the Community 
legislation on finding that it violates fundamental human rights as enshrined in 
the national constitutions. The judgment in the Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft67 serves as an example of a conflict between EC law (regulation) and pro-
visions of the German constitution. The case involved the administration of a fi-
nancial penalty (forfeiture of an export deposit), permitted by the EC Regula-
tion, by the German government against the German exporter. The plaintiff 
claimed that the regulation in question infringed the principle of proportionality, 
provided for by the German constitution, and should therefore be nullified. As a 
rule, due to the superior position of the constitution in the hierarchy of legal acts, 
any ordinary law in breach of the constitution is invalid. EC law has been in-
corporated into the German legal system by statutory. The German constitution 
includes no provision allowing to override the constitutional norm in case of 
conflict with the Community law. The European Court of Justice emphasised, in 
the strongest terms, that the legality of the Community provision cannot be 
judged in the light of national law: 
“Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the 
validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have 
an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The va-
lidity of such measures can only be judged in the light of Community law. In 
fact the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot 
because of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however 
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and with-
out the legal basis of the Community itself being called in question. Therefore 
the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a member state can-
not be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights 
as formulated by the constitution of that state or the principles of a national 
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constitutional structure.”68 
The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) stated 
that: 
“as long as the integration process has not progressed so far that Community 
law also possesses a catalogue of rights … of settled validity, which is ade-
quate in comparison with a catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the 
German constitution, the German Federal Constitutional Court would permit 
German constitutional review of the EC law (Solange I).”69 
The Court stated that Article 24 of the German constitution, which was the ba-
sis for the German accession to the EC, did not permit the violation of funda-
mental rights. Consequently, as long as no Bill of Rights existed on the Com-
munity level, the German Constitutional Court was in a position to control the 
compatibility of Community law with German fundamental rights.70  
Later, the German Federal Constitutional Court set aside the Solange I doc-
trine and in Solange II declared that:  
“a measure of protection of fundamental rights has been established … which, 
in its conception, substance and manner of implementation, is essentially 
compatible with the standards established by the German constitution.”71 
The preliminary references from German courts attacking the constitutionality 
of EC acts have been prohibited “as long as the EC, and in particular the ECJ, 
generally ensures an effective protection of fundamental rights.”72 The Ger-
man Constitutional Court departed from its previous position in a notable way. 
It stated that, due to the sufficient development of the protection of funda-
mental rights on the Community level, the control of compatibility of EC law 
with German fundamental rights was no longer necessary. It shall be observed, 
however, that the position of the German Constitutional Court, although pro-
gressive, never reached the unconditional statement of the European Court of 
Justice that the Community norm cannot be overridden by “domestic legal 
provisions, however framed”73 and consequently, that the Community law 
would take precedence over any domestic norm, including “principles of a 
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nationally constitutional structure”.74 
The second principle concerning the role of human rights considerations in 
the application of the Community law has been established in the Wachauf 
decision. According to the Wachauf formula, the Member States are bound by 
human rights recognised as general principles of Community law when they 
implement the Community law.75 
Finally, according to the judgment in the ERT case, the Member States are 
bound by fundamental rights when they are relying on an overriding require-
ment relating to the public interest or on the grounds for justification stipulated 
in the Treaty in order to justify a national rule which is likely to obstruct the 
exercise of a fundamental freedom arising from the Treaty.76 
7. Fundamental rights as limits to fundamental freedoms 
The most conspicuous and prominent element of the judgment in the Schmid-
berger case was the direct application of fundamental rights as distinct excep-
tions to fundamental freedoms.77 The Advocate General pleaded for consider-
ing human rights as a public policy objective justifying the exception to the 
free movement of goods. According to his reasoning the Court would have to 
establish whether, in relying on the particular fundamental rights recognised in 
Austrian law, Austria was, as a matter of Community law, pursuing a legiti-
mate objective in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on a fun-
damental freedom.78 The Court did not follow the Advocate General’s opinion. 
Instead it recognised the fundamental rights as a distinct ground of justification 
for imposing restrictions on the fundamental freedom. 
The Advocate General admitted that “it might seem excessive and unduly 
intrusive to question whether a Member State which relies on a particular fun-
damental right recognised in its national legal order pursues a legitimate public 
interest objective.”79 Indeed it seems difficult to understand how scrutiny of 
the justification based on the public policy objective would differ from scru-
tiny of the independent human right exception.80 Especially in cases when the 
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right relied upon by a Member State is at the same time protected at the Com-
munity level (e.g. in Schmidberger – freedom of expression). In such cases, it 
seems, the application of different methods of introducing exceptions to funda-
mental freedoms would lead to the same conclusion – granting or denying the 
protection of a particular fundamental right. The balancing of the conflicting 
interests and the determination of the scope of protection of the rights at issue 
would remain the key question. The Advocate General admitted that when a 
Member State seeks to protect fundamental rights recognised in the Com-
munity law it necessarily pursues a legitimate objective since the Community 
cannot prohibit Member States from pursuing objectives which it is itself 
bound to pursue.81 He pointed out, however, that there might exist divergences 
between the human rights catalogues of Member States and that “it cannot 
therefore be automatically ruled out that a Member State which invokes the ne-
cessity to protect a right recognised by national law as fundamental never-
theless pursues an objective which, as a matter of Community law, must be re-
garded as illegitimate.”82 A situation of this kind seems to be rather an excep-
tion, especially in the light of the convergence of the standards of protection of 
human rights on the European continent. 
The thesis put forward in this paper is that within the ambit of application 
of Community law, the actions of Member States are to be scrutinised in the 
light of Community law, that is for conformity with the Community standards 
of human rights protection. If the human rights are recognised as a distinct and 
independent ground of justification for restrictions upon fundamental free-
doms, the scrutiny of the justification relied upon by the Member States will be 
based on the Community standard of human rights protection. This is due to 
the fact that any derogation from the obligations imposed by the Treaty is to be 
judged in the light of the Community law itself. Furthermore, the human rights 
as limits upon fundamental freedoms are a special case and differ from other 
possible exceptions to the fundamental freedoms specified in the Treaty in that 
they do not form a ground of exception related specifically to a particular 
Member State but are a subject of concern to both Member States and the 
Community.83 
In the Omega case the Court indicated the need to protect human dignity as 
a public policy objective. The statement was somewhat confusing. At first it 
was stated that since the protection of human dignity is in conformity with 
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Community law it was immaterial that in Germany the principle of respect for 
human dignity has the status of an independent human right.84 
The Advocate General explained the difference in reasoning compared to 
the Schmidberger case by the inchoate nature of the concept of human dignity 
in the Community law, due to which it was  
“impossible for the Court – unlike in the Schmidberger judgment – immedi-
ately to equate the substance of the guarantee of human dignity under the 
German Basis Law with that of the guarantee of human dignity as recognised 
in the Community law.”85 
A situation of this kind seems to be rather exceptional. The fundamental rights 
as general principles of Community law derive from the common constitu-
tional traditions of the Member States and draw inspiration from the inter-
national human rights treaties on which the Member States collaborated or to 
which they are signatories. A special significance in this regard has been ac-
corded to the European Convention on Human Rights, which emerged as an 
effective Europe-wide system of human rights protection, binding and applied 
also within the Community. Thus, the judge-made development of the Com-
munity bill of human rights is symptomatic of a strive towards a convergence 
and uniformity of standards of protection on the European continent. With re-
gard to the possibility of divergences between the human rights catalogues of 
the Member States and the Community, the decisive question appears not to be 
whether a particular right is encompassed by the Community catalogue, but 
what is the scope of this right, to what extent it allows restrictions in accor-
dance with the Community law. 
The Omega and Schmidberger judgments seem to once again deal with the 
problem of the authority to ultimately define the standards of protection of 
human rights. This discussion exposes a struggle between the European Court 
of Justice and the national constitutional courts as well as the fields of possible 
conflicts between the national and Community standards of fundamental rights 
protection. If the restriction on a fundamental Treaty freedom is based on the 
need to protect fundamental rights as enshrined in the national constitution of a 
Member State, to what extent can the European Court of Justice reject the 
national human rights considerations as incompatible with the Community law 
or to what extent can a Member State invoke the national human rights consid-
erations and through that arbitrarily frustrate the Community law provisions on 
fundamental freedoms? 
In Omega the Advocate General put forward the following thesis: 
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“In the present case (…) it remains to be established whether the protection of 
human dignity required under the German Basic Law should be considered in 
the context of justification for the public order notice in question or whether 
the existence of the corresponding guarantee of a fundamental right in Com-
munity law makes a decision necessary at Community law level (…). 
Because of the inchoate nature of the concept of human dignity, however, it is 
almost impossible for the Court in this case – unlike in the Schmidberger 
judgment – immediately to equate the substance of the guarantee of human 
dignity under the German Basic Law with that of the guarantee of human 
dignity as recognised in Community law.”86 
The Schmidberger case is symptomatic of a direct conflict between the free-
dom of expression and the free movement of goods, whereas in Omega the 
Court resorted to the concept of public policy considerations as justification for 
imposing restrictions upon the fundamental freedom.87 It appears that in cases 
of clashes between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms, the direct 
application of the human right in line with the Schmidberger judgment (human 
right as a distinct exception to the free movement provisions), will depend on 
whether the fundamental right concerned is protected under the Community 
law alongside the possibility to equate the substance of the guarantees on the 
national and European level. The conflict at issue will then amount to a con-
flict between the Community fundamental freedoms and the Community funda-
mental rights. In the process of balancing, the Member States enjoy a wide 
margin of discretion and the European Court of Justice plays a supervisory role 
in controlling and determining whether a fair balance was struck between the 
competing interests.88  
The judgments in Omega and Schmidberger seem to draw attention to the 
problem of the national application of the Community human rights law. In 
situations of conflict between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms 
state authorities applying Community law will have to balance the competing 
interests. In this regard it is of particular importance to better define – on the 
Community level – the scope of protection of particular rights, that is the scope 
of restrictions which can be imposed upon these rights. As a matter of Commu-
nity law, European citizens have to enjoy the same rights throughout Europe. It 
is therefore not sufficient to say that the citizens of Europe enjoy the right to 
free expression. The requirement of legal certainty and the uniform application 
of Community law can be fulfilled only if the framework of the restrictions 
which are allowed upon the right in question is better defined at the Commun-
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ity level. Provided that this general framework has been designed, the Member 
States may be granted a margin of appreciation in balancing the competing in-
terests. The execution of the discretion is, however, subject to the ECJ’s super-
vision. The Court may therefore define the limits of possible restrictions upon 
the fundamental Community rights. 
Consequently a complex theoretical framework for the protection of funda-
mental rights has emerged. It differentiates between (1) the national applica-
tion of the Community fundamental rights, given the margin of appreciation 
accorded to the Member States in line with the Schmidberger formula, and (2) 
the reliance on the national fundamental rights (as incorporated in the national 
constitutions), which cannot yet be equated with the Community rights (al-
though the right as such might be protected – in the Omega judgment the Court 
held that the human dignity is protected under Community law), and have to be 
therefore treated as public policy justifications for the imposition of restrictions 
on fundamental freedoms, scrutinised, however, for conformity with the Com-
munity fundamental rights in line with the ERT judgment. 
8. Restrictions upon fundamental rights in the EU context 
The process of balancing conflicting interests necessitates a recourse to the 
problem concerning the scope of allowable restrictions on fundamental rights 
in the EU law context. The thesis put forward in this paper is that the process 
of balancing conflicting interests has to be anchored in the concept of allow-
able restrictions, which can be imposed upon the fundamental right at issue. 
The key question is therefore the scrutiny of the allowable restrictions on 
fundamental rights. It has been noticed that the ECJ acknowledged almost any 
allegedly violated human right as protected by the Union’s legal order, but 
hardly ever did it define the actual scope of that right.89 Definitely the lack of 
determination of the exact scope of rights is detrimental to their visibility and it 
would certainly be of much benefit if the scope and the relationship between 
different human rights were better defined.90 Commentators explain this 
situation by referring to the manner in which the ECJ developed fundamental 
rights, namely – as the French Constitutional Council – through the general 
principles of law.91 It has been said that  
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90  Ibid., 1331; see also cited there: Storr, Zur Bonität des Grundrechtsschutzes in der EU, 
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“the relationship between different general principles is more difficult to define 
than the relation between positive provisions of an authoritative text.”92  
It remains to be seen if the Charter will serve as a convenient tool in concretis-
ing fundamental rights and will lead to their more precise handling.93 Title VII 
of the Charter contains general clauses which relate to its interpretation and 
application. Art. II-112 (1) TCE defines the conditions for restrictions on rights 
and freedoms.94 According to this provision: 
“[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.” 
In other words, to pass a scrutiny test a restriction must be: 
1. prescribed by law, 
2. respect the essence of the right or freedom at issue,95 
3. necessary but proportionate to genuinely meet  
a) the objectives of general interest recognised by the Union, 
b) the need to protect the rights and freedom of others. 
As far as the freedom of expression is concerned, this test greatly resembles 
the “necessity test” as set out in Art. 10 (2) ECHR. 
The need to examine the extent to which fundamental rights allow restric-
tions has been clearly stated in the Omega case by Advocate General Stix-
Hackl.96 The scope of allowable restrictions is connected with the concept of a 
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95  The prerequisite that the limits imposed on rights must be justified by the overall 
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(supra note 13), para 14. 
96  Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, Omega (supra note 3), para 53. 
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margin of discretion left to Member States and the scrutiny test applied by the 
Court with regard to justifications for restriction. There exists a considerable 
uniformity of view between scholars in criticising the Court for the lack of co-
herence and visibility in determining the exact scope of fundamental rights.97 
With regard to the Bosman case commentators criticised the Court for not even 
trying to shape the right to freedom of assembly in Community law. As a result 
the range of limitations also remained vague and the process of balancing was 
tainted by failure.98 
As the freedom of expression lies at the core of discussion in this paper, a 
digression will be made to illustrate differing levels of protection accorded to 
different forms of speech. In more concrete terms the problem of the scope of 
protection of commercial speech in the Community legal order will be pre-
sented in brief. Different levels of protection resulting from differing tests of 
scrutiny applied with regard to different forms of expression are symptomatic 
of the importance of the examination of the extent to which the fundamental 
rights allow restrictions, which in turn makes it possible to define in a more 
precise manner the exact scope of the right in question. 
The issue of commercial speech was raised on the occasion of the challenge 
to the legality of the Tobacco Advertising Directive99. Germany instituted 
proceedings seeking the annulment of the Directive. Several possible grounds 
for annulment have been raised, inter alia, the violation of the right to freedom 
of speech. The question whether a restriction allegedly pursuing public health 
objectives is proportional under the “necessity test” set out in Art. 10 (2) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights has been examined. This paper will 
refer to the reasoning presented by Advocate General Fennelly in this respect. 
The issue of compatibility of the restriction on advertising and sponsorship of 
tobacco products with the right to freedom of expression has not been ad-
dressed in the Court’s judgment, due to the fact that it upheld the challenge on 
the grounds of lack of proper Treaty basis and annulled the Directive. 
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9. Defining commercial speech and its scope of protection in 
the Community 
Advocate General Fennely defines commercial speech as: 
“the provision of information, expression of ideas or communication of im-
ages as part of the promotion of a commercial activity and the concomitant 
right to receive such communication.”100 
A clear statement as to the need for protection of commercial expression 
follows: 
“Commercial expression should also be protected in Community law. Com-
mercial expression does not contribute in the same way as political, journalis-
tic, literary or artistic expression do (…) to the achievement of social goods. 
(…) Individuals’ freedom to promote commercial activities derives not only 
from their right to engage in economic activities and the general commitment, 
in the Community context, to a market economy based upon free competition, 
but also from their inherent entitlement as human beings freely to express and 
receive views on any topic, including the merits of the goods or services 
which they market or purchase.”101 
Commercial speech is clearly recognised by the Community law.102 Its pro-
tection is based on the general statement that all speech – regardless of form – 
is protected. However, the freedom of expression is not absolute and may be 
subject to restrictions so as to achieve certain objectives of relevance for the 
common good or to secure the rights of others.103 Thus, the exact scope of pro-
tection will be established by reference to the restrictions. 
The Advocate General referred to the rules governing the imposition of 
restrictions on the right to free speech under the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights and distinguished between the general rule in this regard and the 
specific case of commercial expression. As a matter of rule the restrictions 
imposed on the exercise of the right to free speech have to be justified by pre-
senting evidence of a pressing social need for their imposition.104 The com-
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mercial expression represents a special case in this regard. The European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that the national authorities enjoy a wider 
margin of appreciation with regard to commercial speech, therefore the restric-
tions imposed thereupon are subject to a less severe scrutiny test.105 On this 
basis Advocate General Fennely submitted that limits upon commercial speech 
are acceptable where the competent authorities ‘on reasonable grounds’ had 
considered the restrictions to be necessary.106 
In the Tobacco Advertising case the difference in treatment was justified by 
reference to different functions and interactions with more general public inter-
est. The Advocate General concluded that whereas 
“the political expression serves certain extremely important social interest 
(…) commercial speech does not normally perform a wider social function of 
the same significance.”107 
The so-called public debate test has been applied by the ECtHR in determining 
the level of protection accorded to the speech in a commercial context.108 The 
same test has been explicitly applied by the ECJ in the case which gave rise to 
the preliminary ruling in Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH and 
Troostwijk GmbH109. The provisions of Austrian Unfair Competition Law 
prohibited certain statements in advertising goods for sale. The Court had to 
establish whether such a regulation, if capable of distorting intra-Community 
trade, was in conformity with the principle of freedom of expression as guaran-
teed in Art. 10 ECHR.110 The Court recognised that Member States enjoy dis-
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cretion in balancing the competing interests. In this regard, however,  
“[w]hen the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to a discussion of 
public interest and, in addition, arises in a context in which the Member States 
have a certain amount of discretion, review is limited to an examination of the 
reasonableness and proportionality of the interference. This holds true for the 
commercial use of freedom of expression, particularly in a field as complex 
and fluctuating as advertising.”111  
On this ground the Court held that the restrictions imposed by Paragraph 30 (1) 
Austrian Law on Unfair Competition were reasonable and proportionate in the 
light of the legitimate objectives pursued, namely consumer protection and fair 
trading.112 In the light of this judgment the conclusion may be drawn that the 
Court seems to differentiate between the exercise of freedom of expression 
which does or does not contribute to a discussion on matters of public concern. 
As a consequence a less strict test is applied in scrutinising the restrictions im-
posed on the exercise of the right to free speech in a commercial context and as 
a consequence Member States are granted a wider margin of discretion, just as 
under the ECHR. 
The demonstration in the Schmidberger case was clearly a political demon-
stration, calling for a healthy environment and drawing attention to the danger 
to public health caused by the constant increase in the traffic of heavy vehi-
cles.113 The Court followed the opinion of the Advocate General and stated 
that although the environment and public health can constitute a legitimate 
objective in public interest, capable of justifying a restriction on the fundamen-
tal freedom, the specific aims of the demonstration are not in themselves mate-
rial in legal proceedings, which seek to establish the liability of a Member 
State for breach of Community law.114 Such a statement follows from the fact 
that, in establishing Member State’s liability, account can be taken only of the 
action or omission imputable to that Member State.115 Thus account should be 
taken solely of the objective pursued by the national authorities in their 
implicit decision to authorise or to ban the demonstration in question.116 Some 
commentators submit that only discriminatory effects of demonstrations should 
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be considered (based on the comparison with Commission v France above), 
not the views or intentions of the demonstrators.117 It remains to be seen, yet it 
is submitted here, that the form of speech may play a role in balancing the con-
flicting interests in cases where freedom of expression clashes with free move-
ment. The thesis put forward in this paper is that the process of balancing 
conflicting interests has to be anchored in the concept of allowable restrictions 
to a fundamental right. As the Court repeatedly emphasised, the national au-
thorities are accorded a wide margin of discretion. The Court thus plays a 
supervisory role in determining whether a fair balance has been struck between 
the competing interests. In the Schmidberger case the balance had to be struck 
between the freedom of expression on the one hand and the freedom of 
movement of goods on the other, not – as the Court rightly pointed out – be-
tween environmental protection, which the demonstrators promoted, and the 
free movement. A rather vague statement followed that Austrian authorities 
were inspired by considerations linked to fundamental rights of demonstrators 
to free expression.118 This paper claims that the form of speech plays a role in 
the process of balancing competing interests along the lines of the Karner119 
judgement, in which the Court admitted a possibility of further-reaching re-
strictions in cases of speech which does not contribute to a debate on an issue 
of great public concern. It seems, however, that the Court in the Schmidberger 
judgment referred to the aims of the demonstrators within the given category 
of expression, that is political expression. Within this category it is indeed of 
no relevance whether the demonstrators aimed at drawing public attention to 
the issues of environmental protection, or whether they expressed their support 
for a particular political party, or whether they were against the war on Iraq. 
10. Conclusions 
By incorporating the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Constitutional 
Treaty the symbolic role and visibility of fundamental rights in the Union’s 
legal system has been raised.120 Will the Charter thus influence the process of 
balancing in cases of clashes between fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms? Some commentators emphasise that by granting a fundamental 
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status to civic, political and social rights; the Charter denied such a status to 
the four fundamental economic freedoms.121 As it has been demonstrated in 
this paper the Court interpreted the exceptions to the fundamental freedoms 
through a systematic interpretation of the Community law as a whole and ac-
cording to some authors one might be inclined to think that the Charter rein-
forces such an approach by means of providing guidance because fundamental 
rights might be read as a numerus clausus of exceptions.122 According to some 
opinions  
“the different abstract weighting of fundamental rights versus fundamental 
freedoms propitiated by the Charter might lead to a different structuring of the 
weighting and balancing of them in case of conflict, and more specifically, to 
the shifting of the burden of argumentation in favour of fundamental rights”.123 
The question of an order of rank and degrees of fundamentality can be an-
swered neither in abstract terms nor in an absolute manner. It remains to be 
seen whether the statement of Advocate General Jacobs that  
“the cases, in which a Member State will invoke the necessity to protect fun-
damental right to justify a restriction on the fundamental freedom, may be-
come more frequent in the future”124  
will prove to be true. The Court will then more often be faced with the need to 
reconcile the requirements of protection of fundamental rights with those 
arising from the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty. Given the wide 
margin of discretion accorded to the Member States, the Court plays a supervi-
sory role in scrutinising whether a fair balance has been struck between the 
conflicting interests. As some authors put it:  
“It is a common-place for judges to seek to resolve conflicts between “con-
stitutional”, “fundamental”, or “human rights” (…) by balancing one against 
the other.”125  
The thesis put forward in this paper is that the process of balancing conflicting 
interests has to be anchored in the concept of allowable restrictions which can 
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be imposed on fundamental right at issue. The freedom of expression, despite 
its undeniable significance in a democratic society, is not absolute. Nor is the 
free movement of goods. The process of balancing demands a broad inquiry 
into what is the exact scope of the fundamental right in question. The ECJ re-
peatedly and overtly ruled that fundamental rights are subject to restrictions. 
There is considerable uniformity of view in this regard, but more disagreement 
and hence less certainty with regard to the scope of allowable restrictions. Yet 
before any process of balancing can begin and any of the interests can tip the 
balance, the exact scope of the fundamental right has to be determined through 
recourse to the restrictions which this right allows. The relevance of this thesis 
is readily apparent in the light of the criticisms levelled at the lack of a 
coherent approach by the ECJ in determining the range of restrictions which 
fundamental rights allow.126 This paper advocates therefore a more wide-rang-
ing inquiry into the exact scope of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
legal order of the European Union. 
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